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An Inconvenient Lie: Big Tobacco Was Put on
Trial for Denying the Effects of Smoking; Is
Climate Change Denial Off-Limits?
Elizabeth Dubats*
ABSTRACT
Plaintiffs have made several notable attempts to bring nuisance, trespass, and
negligence suits against major sources of greenhouse gas emissions for climate change
related injuries. While climate change is a widely recognized environmental issue, courts
have refused to recognize it as a basis for a valid cause of action in tort, finding either
petitioners lack standing to bring the claim, or that the claim raises political questions
that should not be addressed by the judiciary. Some more recent climate change tort
claims have also included allegations of fraud on the part of the hydrocarbon industry for
actively perpetuating misinformation about climate change. These claims have
interesting parallels in fraud claims brought against tobacco companies regarding the
dangers of smoking. These commonalities are relevant to the extent that mass fraud
claims against the tobacco industry, unlike similar claims against the petroleum industry,
were recognized as justiciable. This raises the question of whether there is a legally
relevant difference between the two claims of fraudulent activity that would justify
justiciability in one instance and not the other. This Note argues there is not. Both claims
essentially allege fraud based on the denial of the scientific cause of the harm, and both
claims target large contributors to a scientifically complex chain of causation. To the
extent that climate change is a more or less scientifically sound chain of causation is a
scientific question, not a political one, and is within the competency of the courts to
resolve.
“I told you before I'm not a scientist . . . . That’s why I don't want to have
to deal with global warming, to tell you the truth.” —Justice Antonin
Scalia.1
“Courts must decide every case that walks in the courthouse door, even
when it presents the kind of jurisprudential, public policy, evidentiary, and
case management problems inherent in this litigation.” —United States v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc.2
*

Juris Doctor, 2012, Northwestern University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Michael Barsa
for his valuable feedback and the editors of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their
helpful comments.
1
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23:1–5, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
2
449 F.Supp.2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2006).
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INTRODUCTION

Human activity has consequences. If I hit someone with my car, the laws of physics
tell me that action will likely cause harm. If I release 6,956,800,000 metric tons of carbon
dioxide into the Earth’s atmosphere,3 the laws of physics tell me that this matter does not
just disappear, and there is scientific consensus that it causes harm. If I tell someone
something I know is untrue, I run the risk that they will believe me and act upon this
misinformation to their detriment, or the detriment of others. This Note addresses the
intersection of science, accountability, and tort. Generally speaking, tort actions comprise
a very small percentage of litigation based on climate change.4 However, the claims
brought, mostly under nuisance, negligence, and trespass theories have garnered
disproportionate attention for their audacity. Recognizing climate change as part of a
cause of action in tort pulls this scientific phenomenon that has seemingly eluded
legislators due to sheer complexity from Capitol Hill and places it onto the federal
dockets.
Broadly speaking, climate change tort forces courts to confront the limitations of
the judicial branch. The approach thus far has been for courts to respond to this
confrontation with dismissal of the case on political question or standing grounds.5
However, the once radical view that these nuisance cases are no different from any other
case with complex questions of proximate cause has gained some traction.6 While the
common law property tort allegations raised in recent climate change cases have garnered
a good amount of academic attention,7 very little attention has been paid to the fraud and
3

Total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions for 2008. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2008 (Apr. 15, 2010).
4
David Markell & J.B. Rulh, An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigation in the United States, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10644 (2010). A breakdown of climate change litigation by the numbers
reveals that common law tort actions comprise less than five percent of claims filed. Id.
5
See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing the
case in part because of the court would be ill equipped to provide the injunctive relief plaintiffs sought,
emissions caps), rev’d, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part and remanded, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). Paradoxically,
the one case that would pose the most problems for judicial manageability and extrajudicial policy
decisions is the one case that has so far eluded dismissal on interlocutory appeal.
6
Susan Muller, Unprecedented Harm: Will the Roberts Court Recognize the Distinction Between Global
Warming and Its Effects?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317 (2010) (examining standing in the context of climate
change litigation, focusing in the issue of harm and the question of whether or not the harm associated with
climate change can ever be concrete and particularized enough for standing); Christopher R. Reeves,
Climate Change on Trial: Making the Case for Causation, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 495 (2009) (analyzing
the causation issues that will arise in any climate change cause of action). The Supreme Court recently
ruled on one such case. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). The Court was evenly
divided on the question of standing and thus affirmed the exercise of discretion on the part of the Second
Circuit. The Court reversed, however on the question of federal common law nuisance, maintaining it is
preempted by EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.
7
E.g., David Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, (Nw. U. L. Pub L.
& Legal Theory Series Working Paper No. 08-16, L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 08-05); Muller, supra
note 6; Reeves, supra note 6; Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, The “Gift” That Keeps on Giving:
Global Warming Meets the Common Law, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 109 (2008); and David A. Grossman,
Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
(2003).
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conspiracy allegations against major greenhouse gas emitting industries. These claims
arise out of the massive public relations and lobbying campaigns conducted in the 1990s
and early 2000s. These misinformation campaigns sought to impede both individual and
political action to prevent climate change by creating doubt as to the existence of
anthropogenic global warming, despite the overwhelming scientific evidence in support
of action.8
From the bench, climate change fraud looks a lot like a tobacco fraud case, and
decades of tobacco litigation may hold some strategic insight for approaching a fraud
case with comparably complex causal chains. Tobacco plaintiffs struggled for many years
to obtain tort compensation for wrongful deaths and other injuries caused by smokingrelated disease.9 Mass fraud and conspiracy claims brought by states were more
successful.10 Eventually, the United States pursued charges under the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).11 The fraud allegations against major
carbon emitting industries follow a pattern of counterscience and reliance on doubt
similar to those made against major tobacco companies regarding their representations of
the health risks of smoking and the addictiveness of cigarettes. 12 In fact, comparisons
have been drawn between tobacco litigation and litigation against the petroleum industry
with respect to other claims:13 both types of cases involve complex chains of causation
with many potential contributing factors and both require a judge to referee a battle of
expert witnesses and to ultimately determine where the weight of the evidence falls. The
question that remains is why courts were ready to confront scientific complexity in the
case of tobacco’s link to cancer and other disease, but continue to find climate change too
daunting to confront on the merits. The difference in the treatment of climate change
related fraud claims and other climate change tort arises largely out of a failure to place
fraud in a causal chain linked to a particularized injury (e.g. sea level rise).14 Where the

8

Third Am. Class Action Compl., Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007)
(No. 1:05-cv-00436-LTS-RHW), ¶ 39; Compl. for Damages Demand for Jury Trial, Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08 1138 SBA) 2008 WL
594713, ¶¶ 189, 190; see also JAMES HOGGAN, CLIMATE COVER-UP: THE CRUSADE TO DENY GLOBAL
WARMING (2009).
9
See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociological History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992).
10
In 1998 the four largest tobacco companies settled with forty-six states. See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF
AGRIC. POLICY, MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 1 (2005),
http://web.archive.org/web/20080625084126/http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msapdf/1109185724_1032468605_cigmsa.pdf.
11
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006); Scott L. Zeger et al., Statistical Testimony on Damages in Minnesota v.
Tobacco Industry in STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: STATISTICAL SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 303 (Joseph L. Gastwirth ed., 2000); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp.
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in relevant part, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Philip Morris
USA, Inc. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3501 (2010).
12
DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT (2008).
13
Angela Lipanovich, Comment, Smoke Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil Industry on
the Tobacco Tort Litigation is Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REV. 429 (2005) (examining tobacco
litigation as a model for litigation addressing environmental harms caused by vehicle and power generation
emissions respect to issues of standing, preemption, and products liability).
14
Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer II), 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (mistakenly identifying the fraud injury
as a lack of government action rather than tying the fraud back to the particularized injuries linked to the
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fraud-injury connection in tobacco fraud is fairly straightforward (misrepresentation à
consumption à injury), courts have had more difficulty with the causal chain put into
motion by climate fraud. Further, climate skeptics have done such a good job politicizing
the science at the heart of the issue that courts have written off the scientific question of
climate causation as a nonjusticiable political question.15 However, ultimately climate
change fraud claims are materially indistinguishable from the tobacco fraud lawsuits and
therefore should not be so easily dismissed.
Separating fact from fiction is a core judicial function, and the courts have
developed sophisticated procedural standards in order to determine the validity of expert
testimony.16 Too often the courts have conflated the scientific question at the heart of the
climate change fraud allegations with a nonjusticiable political question, and in the
process, dodged important questions of scientific integrity, corporate accountability and
free speech that are well within their jurisdiction. Part I of this Note examines the
successful RICO case mounted against the tobacco industry and compares the facts of
that case to the facts alleged in current climate change fraud cases; Part II reviews the
treatment of climate change-based tort claims in federal court; Part III discusses the
implications of the comparison between tobacco and climate change claims for the
viability of a climate change fraud claim; Part IV examines the benefits and weaknesses
of addressing climate change fraud through the judicial branch.
I. SCIENTIFIC FRAUD: THE EXAMPLE OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND THE CASE FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE FRAUD
In a narrow sense, climate change tort litigation is unprecedented because, to date,
no climate change-based tort claim has gone to trial on the merits.17 However, issues of
scientific validity are often before federal courts. Further, sweeping allegations of
conspiracy and the manipulation of science to defraud the public have been litigated in
several instances, perhaps most famously in relation to the denial of the health risks
associated with smoking by tobacco companies. Examining the successful fraud
allegations in these cases provides insight into the strength of the current allegations
against major petroleum, coal, and electricity companies.
A. The Tobacco Industry
Under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the existence
of an enterprise, 2) a pattern of unlawful behavior, 3) participation in the enterprise to
carry out the unlawful behavior, and 4) an effect on interstate commerce.18 Liability for
difference in emissions caused by lack of government and consumer action.), vacated on reh’g en banc,
607 F.3d 1049 (2010).
15
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.2d 863, 874–76 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding
plaintiffs’ nuisance claims nonjusticiable political questions as a threshold matter).
16
See e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
17
Although, in American Electric Power Co. II, the court remanded, defendants have petitioned the
Supreme Court for review of the decision and the Solicitor General has filed a brief in support of review.
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
18
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006). Specifically, the statute provides that
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conspiracy and enterprise under RICO is limited to racketeering activity, which covers a
broad range of offenses associated with organized crime. Under RICO, enterprise is
defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”19 The
racketeering at issue in United States v. Philip Morris was mail and wire fraud, the same
which would be at issue in a climate change fraud case against the hydrocarbon industry
for climate change denial.20 To violate the RICO standard, the mail communications
themselves do not even have to be false; mail must only be used to pursue a fraudulent
end.21
In Philip Morris, plaintiffs accused the tobacco industry of “engaging in a lengthy,
unlawful conspiracy to deceive the American people about the health effects of smoking
and environmental tobacco smoke, the addictiveness of nicotine, the health benefits from
low tar ‘light’ cigarettes, and their manipulation of the design and composition of
cigarettes in order to sustain nicotine addiction.”22 In a massive opinion, with over 3000
findings of fact, the court found the tobacco companies liable for mail and wire fraud and
conspiracy, under RICO, for the representations it made to the public about smoking.23
The court enjoined the tobacco companies from “further use of deceptive brand
descriptors which implicitly or explicitly convey to the smoker and potential smoker that
they are less hazardous to health than full flavor cigarettes.”24
The court found the defendants and others participated in the conduct,
management, and operation of an enterprise that “knowingly and intentionally engaged in
a scheme to defraud smokers and potential smokers for purposes of financial gain, by
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity .. ..“It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
19
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006).
20
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, . . . for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). In general, mail and wire fraud are convenient ways to establish federal question
jurisdiction over what would otherwise be state law claims, since nearly all commercial activity will
involve remote communication and all that is required to implicate § 1341 is that “one does an act with
knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can
reasonably be foreseen.” Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954).
21
“18 U.S.C. § 1341 does not require that any mailing utilized to establish a mail fraud prosecution be
false . . . ‘if the matter mailed is utilized in furtherance of or pursuant to the scheme to defraud.’” United
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 880 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting United States v. Reid,
533 F.2d 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff’d 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
22
Id. at 26–27.
23
“[T]he Government has established that Defendants (1) have conspired together to violate the substantive
provisions of RICO, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and (2) have in fact violated those provisions of the
statute, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).” Id. at 27.
24
Id. at 27.
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making false and fraudulent statements, representations, and promises.”25 The court
found that this scheme was intended to “defraud smokers and potential smokers in order
to maximize their profits by preserving and enhancing the market for cigarettes, to avoid
costly liability judgments, to derail attempts to make smoking socially unacceptable, and
to sustain the cigarette industry.”26 This deception was implemented through a campaign
designed to cast doubt on the emerging science connecting tobacco use with adverse
health effects.27 The court also found deception with respect to the addictiveness of
cigarettes and the manipulation of cigarette design to enhance delivery of nicotine.28
B. Climate Fraud Cases
Common law fraud requires a misrepresentation of material fact, which the
defendant either knows is false, is unsure of accuracy of, or knows lacks basis,29 for the
purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from acting on reasonable reliance on the
fact to their detriment.30 In both of the climate change fraud cases, Comer v. Murphy
Oil31 and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,32 plaintiffs alleged that the
public reasonably relied on industry defendants’ misrepresentations with respect to
climate change; the misrepresentations thereby induced the public to continue burning
fossil fuels and induced politicians to refrain from regulating greenhouse gases.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs argued that this inaction has allowed climate change to escalate
to the point where it has caused the alleged injury.
In Comer v. Murphy Oil,33 plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s greenhouse gas
emissions significantly contributed to global warming.34 The plaintiffs maintained that,
by contributing to the rise in global temperature, defendants' actions were both a direct
and a proximate cause of a significant increase in the strength and therefore destruction
caused by of Hurricane Katrina.35 Plaintiffs brought claims for: 1) unjust enrichment
under Mississippi state law, 2) civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, 3) public and
25

Id. at 852.
Id.
27
The false statements identified by the court included those
deceiving consumers into starting and continuing to buy and smoke cigarettes by
misrepresenting and concealing adverse health effects caused by smoking and exposure
to environmental cigarette smoke, by maintaining that there was an ‘open question’ as to
whether smoking cigarettes causes disease and other adverse effects, despite the fact that
the Defendants knew otherwise, and by ensuring that their research, development, and
marketing of cigarettes remained consistent with these core public positions.
Id.
28
Id.
29
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1979).
30
Id. at § 525.
31
2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607
F.3d 1049 (2010).
32
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
33
Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir.
2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (2010).
34
Third Am. Class Action Compl., Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007)
(No. 1:05-cv-00436-LTS-RHW), at ¶¶ 3–12.
35
Id. at ¶¶ 13–15.
26
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private nuisance, 4) trespass, 5) negligence, and 6) fraudulent misrepresentation and
concealment. The thrust of Comer’s fraud case is that defendants made materially false
statements to the public, which the state and federal governments relied upon in refusing
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. They further alleged that “[t]he public had a right
to rely and did rely upon Defendants' statements, and continued to consume products in
ways that increased Global Warming, all of which resulted in continued and increased
profits to the Defendants. Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Class's injuries were proximately caused
by that reliance.”36
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants, through various trade organizations and think tanks, waged “a long
campaign . . . to mislead the public about the science of global warming.”37 Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged that defendants funded and operated a massive public relations
campaign with the goal of casting doubt upon the then emerging consensus on climate
change, under the cover of independent, grassroots dissent.38 They also alleged that
defendants held, as climate experts, individuals who lacked any real credentials in the
field of climatology.39 These alleged experts “regularly publish[ed] their marginal views
expressing doubts about numerous aspects of climate change science in places like the
Wall Street Journal editorial page but rarely, if ever, in peer-reviewed scientific
journals.”40 Further, they alleged that plaintiffs knew the information they were
disseminating through these organizations was incorrect at the time it was disseminated.41
For example, plaintiffs point to a 1997 study, commissioned by the Edison Electric
Institute and undertaken by independent consultants, that was suppressed for being
unfavorable to the industry argument that climate change regulation would be too hard on

36

Id. at ¶ 39.
Compl. for Damages Demand for Jury Trial, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663
F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08 1138 SBA), 2008 WL 594713, at ¶¶ 189, 190. Plaintiffs
sought “monetary damages for defendants' past and ongoing contributions to global warming, a public
nuisance, and damages caused by certain defendants' acts in furthering a conspiracy to suppress the
awareness of the link between these emissions and global warming.” Id. at ¶ 6.
38
Id. at ¶ 191.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
ICE [Information Council on the Environment] undertook radio advertising blitzes and mass
mailings that attacked the proponents of global warming and used unscientific tactics like calling
attention to small geographic regions with temperature trends that ran against the overall warming
as somehow disproving global warming. Internal documents from ICE revealed that the goal was
to ‘reposition global warming as theory’ not fact and was designed to target ‘older, less educated
males from larger households who are not typically active information-seekers’ and ‘younger,
lower-income women.’
Id. at ¶ 194.
37
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the economy.42 They also alleged that other coalitions supported by the greenhouse gas
emitting industry had similar information on hand, showing knowledge of falsity.43
The connection between the alleged fraud and the concrete and particularized
injury, in Native Village, was pled as follows: 1) defendants are responsible for “a
substantial portion of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that have caused global
warming”;44 2) global warming caused plaintiffs’ injuries;45 3) defendants “conspired to
create a false scientific debate about global warming in order to deceive the public”;46 4)
the goal of this campaign was to stem growing public concern and prevent political action
that would require defendants to change the way they do business47; to the extent that the
public and politicians relied on this misinformation, it was to their detriment.48
In Kivalina, the court’s dismissal of these claims was consistent with its dismissal
of all of the tort claims in that case based on finding a nonjusticiable political question.49
The court found that the plaintiff’s nuisance claim presented such a complex question of
causation that it evaded judicially manageable standards of reaching a reasoned
resolution and presented threshold political questions that would be better addressed by
Congress.50 In Comer, the court lumped plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims together with their,
more generalized, unjust enrichment claims and therefore failed to adequately distinguish
between nuisance claims and conspiracy claims with respect to prudential standing.51

42

In 1997, EEI [Edison Electric Institute] commissioned a study by a reputable consulting firm, ICF
Kaiser, to assess the impact of limiting carbon dioxide emissions on the price of electricity. The
results showed only a modest impact on price—an impact that would be made up by concomitant
conservation savings. EEI buried the study “because it's not damaging enough” according to an
EEI source, and there were discussions at EEI about shredding all copies of the study.
Id. at ¶ 195.
43
In December, 1995 the GCC [Global Climate Coalition], via its Science and Technology Advisory
Committee (GCC-STAC), drafted a primer on the science of global warming for GCC members.
The draft primer included a seven-page section that reviewed the ‘contrarian’ arguments and
theories and listed a ‘counter-argument’ for every single one of them. The description of the
counter-arguments demonstrate the GCC and its members were well aware that the contrarian
theories, which they publicly touted as casting doubt on the science of global warming, were
incorrect.
Id. ¶ 205.
44
Compl. for Damages Demand for Jury Trial, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663
F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08 1138 SBA), 2008 WL 594713, at ¶ 3.
45
Id. at ¶ 4.
46
Id. at ¶ 5.
47
Id. at ¶ 269 “At all times the Conspiracy Defendants were concerned that the public would become
concerned by global warming and that the growing concern would force a change in the Conspiracy
Defendants' behavior which would be costly. Delaying these costs was the major objective of the
conspiracies described herein.” Id.
48
Id. at ¶ 273.
49
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
50
Id. at 876.
51
Third Am. Class Action Compl., Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss.
2007) (No. 1:05-cv-00436-LTS-RHW), at ¶¶ 24–26 (“This conspiracy delayed and otherwise interfered
with individual and government action to address Global Warming, and consequently contributed to
Plaintiffs’ injuries . . . .”) (internal footnote omitted).
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C. Parallel Campaigns
There is an interesting parallel between the tobacco tactics, ultimately found to be
unlawful, and the climate change-denial tactics alleged by plaintiffs and by journalists.52
One common thread is the use of trade organizations to coordinate their information
campaign and provide distance between the campaign and the source of funding. For the
tobacco industry, these organizations were the Tobacco Institute (later renamed the
Council for Tobacco Research) and the Center for Indoor Air Research, Inc. (CIAR).
These organizations were subsequently dissolved as part of a settlement with forty-six
states’ attorneys general in 1998.53
These tobacco organizations have eerie doppelgangers in the climate change
industries. In the early 1990s, the Western Fuels Association, a coal industry trade
association, together with the Edison Electric Institute, created the Information Council
on the Environment (ICE).54 ICE hired a public relations firm to conduct a campaign to
cast doubt on climate change science.55 The organization hired spokespeople with
scientific expertise in areas other than climatology to lend legitimacy to their campaign.56
ICE attempted to spin the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide as beneficial to plant
life and even went so far as to make a documentary film that was widely distributed to
universities on the subject.57
The fossil fuel industry has taken this distancing a step further. Major greenhouse
gas emitting industry groups have been accused of “astroturfing” in order to cast doubt on
climate change science and undermine calls for regulation. “Astroturfing” is the term
coined to describe the tactic where established special interests organize a campaign to
create the appearance of a grassroots movement. The Advancement of Sound Science
Coalition (TASSC) is such an organization.58 The group was originally developed by a
public relations firm, APCO Worldwide, for Philip Morris to counter scientific research
on the dangers of tobacco use.59 The group reached out to a number of corporations with
science-related image problems, including major petroleum and chemical corporations.60
The firm purposely targeted their campaign to smaller cities where they would receive
less pushback from experts and reporters.61 The American Petroleum Institute (API) and
the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) are also among the organizations that have

52

ExxonMobil has attracted a particularly large amount of attention for its spending in connection with
climate change denial. So much so, that Greenpeace has dedicated blog space entirely to the company’s
spending habits. See ExxonSecrets, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/campaigns/globalwarming-and-energy/exxon-secrets/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
53
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE, supra note 10, at 1, 3.
54
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 32.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Defending Hot Air: TASSC Takes on Global Warming, PR WATCH, available at
http://www.prwatch.org/prwissues/1997Q3/tassc.html (last visited May 6, 2012).
59
Id.
60
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 41.
61
Id. at 38–39.
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been accused of providing a pseudo-independent front for the hydrocarbon industry in
order to spread misinformation about climate change science without raising suspicions.62
One key difference between the two misinformation campaigns is that while
tobacco industry scientists compiled a wealth of data,63 the fossil fuel industry’s
campaign on climate skepticism is notable for its paucity of original data or experts in the
specific field of climate research.64 The tobacco industry was infamous for attacking
independent studies on the one hand, while vigorously arming itself with in-house
counter research in the event of litigation on the other.65 Records, leaked in the course of
tobacco litigation, revealed that Philip Morris specifically vetted scientists hired to
research the health effects of tobacco use for their leanings, and prospective researchers
were informed their work would be filtered through lawyers.66
Conversely, the fossil fuel industry has maintained the climate change debate via
petitions, editorials,67 and reconstructions of other researchers’ datasets. An infamous
example of science by petition is the Oregon Institute’s petition of 34,000 scientists who
believe climate change is not anthropogenic.68 The petition was designed to undermine
the scientific consensus in support of anthropogenic warming. It created the impression
of a debate without raising any issues or even presenting the credentials of its signatories.
A random sampling of thirty signatories later revealed that, of the signatories that would
return calls, eleven still agreed with the petition, six would not sign it knowing what they
know now, and three do not remember signing anything to that effect.69
The most famous data reconstruction involved a statistical reconstruction of a
famous graph aggregating climate data from various sources to chart global climate
change since the year 1400; it depicted a steep warming trend in the twentieth century.70
The study, conducted by retired mining executive Steven McIntyre71 and economist Ross
62

Jeff Nesmith, Foes of Global Warming Theory Have Energy Ties, SEATTLEPI (June 1, 2003),
http://www.seattlepi.com/national/article/Foes-of-global-warming-theory-have-energy-ties1116097.php#ixzz1u48lS5QE; Scientist to CEI: You Used My Research To “Confuse and Mislead,”
FACTCHECK.ORG (May 26, 2006), http://www.factcheck.org/misleadingads/scientist_to_cei_you_used_my_research.html.
63
See, e.g., Luben G. Anceloff, Cigarette Smoking is Not the Cause of Cancer: Effect of Nicotine and Tar
on Nucleic Acids of Rat Lung and Spleen, 23 THE NUCLEUS 56 (1980), available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wbc88d00/pdf;jsessionid=5D64BA2B7D367C37DC48D8B464F65F3C.to
bacco03.
64
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 99–133.
65
See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT 21 (2010) (observing that research
was already underway to develop a safer cigarette at the same time the industry insisted there was no
significant health risk.).
66
John Schwartz, Philip Morris Sought Experts to Cloud Issue, Memo Details, WASH. POST, May 9, 1997,
at A02.
67
See, e.g., Patrick J. Michaels, Record Low for Climate Science, CATO INSTITUTE (Aug. 31, 2008),
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/record-low-climate-science; Patrick J. Michaels, Global
Warming Gomorrah in Hell: Welcome to Washington, CATO INSTITUTE (Aug. 5, 2011),
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/global-warming-gomorrah-hell-welcome-washington.
68
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 88–89.
69
Id. at 91.
70
Steven McIntyre & Ross McKirtrick, Corrections to the Mann et al. (1998) Proxy Data Base and
Northern Hemisphereic Average Temperature Series, 14 ENERGY & ENV’T 751 (2003).
71
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 111.
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McKitrick,72 purported to show a fatal error in the way the proxy data was handled. They
suggested that the hockey stick shape of the graph was a product of error and unjustified
manipulation of the source data.73 Politicians quickly picked up the study, and it triggered
a Senate hearing on the subject where Senator Inhofe declared global warming to be “the
greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people.”74 Meanwhile, despite the sound
and fury, the results of the original study have been affirmed by the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences.75 This episode illustrates just how easily politics can manipulate
the public discourse on scientific issues. The industry campaign against climate change
science very much follows in the footsteps of the tobacco industry, but it also learned
from and advanced building upon these tactics by creating even more perceived distance
between the source of the information and its dissemination.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE TORT, JUSTICIABILITY, AND STANDING
A. Climate Change in the Courtroom
Despite striking similarities between tobacco and climate change fraud allegations,
no tort action based on damages caused by climate change has defeated dismissal and
gone to trial on the merits. To date, every attempt to bring a cause of action, based on a
climate change-related tort injury, has either been dismissed for lack of standing or for
lack of jurisdiction under the political question doctrine, or both. The notable exception is
American Electric Power Co. II,76 which is on remand after interlocutory review by the
Supreme Court.
The major points of the political question doctrine are laid out in Baker v. Carr.77
Baker identifies six factors used to determine whether a case is justiciable. These include:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.78
72

Id.
McIntyre & McKirtrick, supra note 70, at 766.
74
Andrew C. Revkin, Politics Reasserts Itself in the Debate Over Climate Change and Its Hazards, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/05/science/earth/05CLIM.html?ex=1061081071&ei=1&en=a7013e07ce
beb1fa.
75
Geoff Brumfiel, Academy Affirms Hockey-Stick Graph, 441 NATURE 1032, 1032–33 (2006).
76
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
77
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
78
Id.
73
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The factors most often at issue in climate change cases are a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards and the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination.79
The first major climate change tort case was Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co. (AEP I).80 In AEP I, several states filed suit against American Electric Power
Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and other energy-related corporations for
public nuisance under federal common law or, in the alternative, state common law.81
Plaintiffs sought an injunction to cap greenhouse gas emissions.82 The Southern District
of New York granted defendant’s motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because
the case raised nonjusticiable political questions.83 The Southern District reasoned that
“[t]he scope and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals the transcendently
legislative nature of this litigation.”84 The district court’s concern focused mainly on the
determinations that carrying out such an injunction would entail.85 For example, the court
believed that determining the level of emissions at which to set the requested cap would
be beyond the function of the judiciary.86 Ultimately, the court interpreted the absence of
legislative action on climate change as congressional intent not to act.87
In addition to the political question of nonjusticiability, standing was a persistent
problem for early climate change tort cases. The requirements for constitutional standing
are laid out in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.88 Under Lujan,
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and
(b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical[.]’” . . . Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
79

See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 874–76 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
80
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. I), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 270.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 272.
85
See id.
86
See id. Specifically the Court found:
Such relief would, at a minimum, require this Court to: (1) determine the appropriate level at
which to cap the carbon dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine the appropriate
percentage reduction to impose upon Defendants; (3) create a schedule to implement those
reductions; (4) determine and balance the implications of such relief on the United States’ ongoing
negotiations with other nations concerning global climate change; (5) assess and measure available
alternative energy resources; and (6) determine and balance the implications of such relief on the
United States’ energy sufficiency and thus its national security—all without an “initial policy
determination” having been made by the elected branches.
Id. at 272.
87
Id. at 274 (stating “their specific refusal to impose the limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now
seek to impose by judicial fiat confirm that making the ‘initial policy determination[s]’ addressing global
climate change is an undertaking for the political branches.).
88
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

521

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

independent action of some third party not before the court.” . . . Third, it
must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”89
Prior to Massachusetts v. EPA, the question of whether any plaintiff could establish
particularity, traceability, and redressability sufficient to support federal jurisdiction for a
climate change injury was still up in the air after AEP I was dismissed on political
question grounds.90
The next major climate change decision, Massachusetts v. EPA,91 shed more light
on constitutional standing within the context of climate change litigation. Massachusetts
granted the State of Massachusetts special standing to challenge EPA’s decision not to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.92 The Court held that federal
statutory intrusion into traditionally state police power prerogatives gave Massachusetts a
“concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as
arbitrary and capricious.”93 The decision also contained important dicta concerning the
justiciability of climate change-related issues. With respect to the requirement of a
concrete and particularized injury, the Court, in dicta, stated that “[t]he harms associated
with climate change are serious and well recognized.”94 The Court also determined that
the global nature of the phenomenon did not preclude a finding of particularized injury.95
The Court noted “[t]hat these climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does not minimize
Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this litigation.”96 The Court also dismissed
popular objections to allowing standing for climate change cases based on causation and
redressability, dismissing as “erroneous” the “assumption that a small incremental step,
because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum.”97 This notion
of incremental impact also carried over to the redressability requirement.98 The decision
was influential both in the finding of standing itself and the Court’s notice of
anthropogenic climate change in its application of standing principles.
The next major climate change case, and the first to raise issues of fraud, was
Comer I.99 In Comer I, plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed sua sponte after the court
determined at an initial hearing that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claims

89

Id. at 560–61.
AEP I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271 n.6.
91
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 520.
94
Id. at 521.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 522.
97
Id. at 524. “While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself reverse global
warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to
slow or reduce it.” Id. at 525.
98
“The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some
extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to
challenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.” Id. at 526.
99
Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007), rev’d sub nom, 585 F.3d 855 (5th
Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
90
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and that their claims presented nonjusticiable political questions.100 While the decision
was later vacated en banc, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion on appeal provides some interesting
insight into how, building upon Massachusetts v. EPA101 and AEP II,102 justiciable
climate change claims could be developed. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the
Southern District of Mississippi’s dismissal of the case.103 The Fifth Circuit found that
“plaintiffs have standing to assert their public and private nuisance, trespass, and
negligence claims, and that none of these claims present nonjusticiable political
questions; but we conclude that their unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation,
and civil conspiracy claims must be dismissed for prudential standing reasons.”104
The Fifth Circuit divided the plaintiffs’ claims between the claims arising out of
climate change itself, which relied on a causal link between defendants’ greenhouse gas
emissions and Hurricane Katrina, and the fraud claims. The court found that “the first set
of claims . . . assert private, common-law claims of the sort that have been long
recognized to give rise to standing,”105 as opposed to more generalized public law claims.
Where defendants challenged plaintiffs’ standing based on the traceability of the harm
back to their actions, the court declined to address the merits of plaintiffs’ causation
claim, noting that at the pleading stage, plaintiffs’ factual allegations are taken as true.106
However, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ fraud-related claims on federal prudential
standing grounds as generalized grievances.107 The prudential standing doctrine limits
federal jurisdiction where 1) “a litigant[] rais[es] another person's legal rights”; 2) the
plaintiff pleads “generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches”; or 3) the plaintiff’s complaint falls outside of “the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked.”108 The court found plaintiffs’ fraud claims to
“involve every purchaser of petrochemicals and the entire American citizenry because the
plaintiffs are essentially alleging a massive fraud on the political system resulting in the
failure of environmental regulators to impose proper costs on the defendants,” and
therefore plaintiffs lacked the particularity required to confer standing.109
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.110 was also dismissed based on
political question nonjusticiability.111 In Native Village, an Inuit village brought suit
under federal common law nuisance against major petroleum companies for damages
attributed to climate change.112 The Northern District of California found that the issue
100

Id.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
102
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
103
Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer II) 585 F.3d 855, 880 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 F.3d
1049 (2010).
104
Id. at 860.
105
Id. at 863 n.3.
106
Id. at 864–65.
107
Id. at 867–68.
108
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
109
Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer II) 585 F.3d 855, 869 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 F.3d
1049 (2010).
110
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
111
Id.
112
Id.
101
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did not implicate a textual commitment to another branch of government.113 Looking at
the questions that the court would have to resolve in order to determine whether the
petroleum companies were responsible for “unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public,”114 the court ultimately determined there was a lack of
judicially manageable standards that could be employed to resolve the dispute.115 The
court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the very same argument on appeal in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Co. (AEP II).116 The court also found the case to require an initial policy determination
that would prove “[e]qually problematic for Plaintiffs” due to the enormous policy
implications of a determination of liability.117 The court explained that “by pressing this
lawsuit, Plaintiffs are in effect asking this Court to make a political judgment that the two
dozen Defendants named in th[e] action should be the only ones to bear the cost of
contributing to global warming.”118 Furthermore, the court found that plaintiffs lacked
Article III standing because the harm claimed was not “fairly traceable” to the
defendants.119
Nine days before the Northern District of California ruled in Native Village, the
Second Circuit handed down their decision on appeal from AEP I. The ninety-page
decision vacated the district court’s dismissal of the case and remanded the case back
down based on its determinations that: 1) the case did not lack “judicially-discoverable
and manageable standards;”120 2) the plaintiffs’ tort claim did not turn on an initial policy
decision beyond judicial discretion;121 3) no other Baker factor was implicated;122 4)
plaintiffs have standing to bring suit;123 5) plaintiffs stated a claim of federal common law
nuisance;124 and 6) plaintiffs’ common law nuisance claim has not been displaced by

113

Id. at 873.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
115
Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp.2d at 874–76.
116
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
117
Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
118
Id. at 877.
119
Id. at 877–78. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the fact that each defendant contributed to
their injury by contributing significant greenhouse gas emissions satisfied the causation requirement of
Article III standing. Further, the court found that plaintiffs’ injuries lie outside of the zone of defendants’
discharge of pollutants. Id. at 881.
120
AEP II, 582 F.3d at 326 (“Defendants’ argument is undermined by the fact that federal courts have
successfully adjudicated complex common law public nuisance cases for over a century. The first cases
involved States bringing claims against other States, or against private parties in other States, in the
Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction.”).
121
“The district court's reliance on a refusal to legislate results in a decision resting on particularly unstable
ground.” Id. at 330.
122
Id. at 331–32.
123
Id. at 333–49. The court, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,
found that plaintiffs qualified for parens patriae standing, and that they sufficiently alleged an injury in fact
that was actual and imminent, fairly traceable to the defendants, and redressable. Id. at 333–49.
124
Id. at 352–71.
114
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federal statute.125 Importantly, the court held the presence of complex scientific issues
presented no obstacle to jurisdiction.126
The Supreme Court recently handed down its review of AEP II. An evenly divided
Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s assertion of jurisdiction over the case with half the
Court following the majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, and the other half finding
a lack of standing in line with the Massachusetts dissent.127 However, the Court reversed
and remanded the Second Circuit to the extent that the federal common law cause of
action had been preempted by EPA’s steps to regulate greenhouse gases.128
B. The Unique Questions Raised by Climate Change Tort Generally and Fraud in
Particular
While the issues of justiciability and prudential standing are far from settled with
respect to climate change tort law, even courts that have been receptive to climate
change-based nuisance claims have dismissed climate change fraud allegations.129 Both
courts and commentators have been torn between viewing climate change like any other
complex causal chain and viewing it as so enormous and complex as to be fundamentally
outside of the scope of adjudication.130 However, even courts that have been receptive to
entertaining climate change as a causal mechanism resulting in concrete and
particularized injury in a nuisance context have not been willing to apply the same
analysis to fraud claims.131 This is largely because courts have viewed these fraud
allegations as general injuries in and of themselves rather than connecting them to the
concrete and particularized injury pled by plaintiffs.

125

Id.
That the district court may be called upon to decide causation issues and apply a remedy does not
remove the case from the ambit of nuisance actions. Federal courts have long been up to the task
of assessing complex scientific evidence in cases where the cause of action was based either upon
the federal common law or upon a statute. They are adept in balancing the equities and in
rendering judgment.
Id. at 329.
127
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
128
Id. at 2537.
129
Compare Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer II), 585 F.3d 855, 868 (5th Cir. 2009) reh’g en banc
granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), on reh'g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Each of the
plaintiffs’ second set of claims presents a generalized grievance that is more properly dealt with by the
representative branches and common to all consumers of petrochemicals and the American public”) with
Id. at 867 (“In their nuisance, trespass and negligence claims, the plaintiffs have clearly satisfied the first
and third constitutional minimum standing requirements. These state common-law tort claims, in which
plaintiffs allege that they sustained actual, concrete injury in fact to their particular lands and property, can
be redressed by the compensatory and punitive damages they seek for those injuries . . . , and the plaintiffs’
first set of claims satisfies the traceability requirement and the standing inquiry.”)
130
Compare James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, and the Political Question
Doctrine, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 919 (2008) with Donald G. Gifford, No ‘Ordinary Tort’—Climate Change
Tort Actions and the Supreme Court, TORTSPROF BLOG (Sept. 20, 2010)
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2010/09/guest-blogger-don-gifford-on-no-ordinary-tortclimatechange-tort-actions-and-the-supreme-court.html.
131
Comer II, 585 F.3d at 869 (finding plaintiffs’ claims of fraud to be based on too generalized and
theoretical of an injury).
126
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Generally, commentators object to climate change-based causes of action because
climate change litigants seek to redress public interests in a branch of government
designed to resolve private interests.132 To these commentators, climate change-based tort
litigation pushes the boundaries of Article III jurisdiction, doing so in ways that violate
the prudential standing prohibition on generalized grievances and violate political
question doctrine by confronting issues that would be best handled by Congress.133
However, some commentators have pointed out, and some courts have recognized,
that the global nature of climate change does not necessarily preclude it from resulting in
concrete and particularized injuries.134 These commentators believe that, so long as
causation is scientifically sound, the injury could be redressed by the legal system in a
way similar to that of other injuries with complex chains of causation.135 These
commentators see climate change tort as an extension of the environmental tort that
preceded modern environmental statutes.136 The notion of climate change as a causal
mechanism that can result in concrete and particularized injury has gained resonance with
some federal courts since traceability, redressability, and concreteness requirements were
recognized by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.137
While fraud carries its own problems of standing, it avoids problems that other
causes of action pose. For instance, climate change fraud claims avoid federal preemption
problems. When states initiated litigation in AEP I138 in 2005, the federal government had
previously taken a strong stance against setting mandatory constraints on greenhouse gas
emissions.139 At that point in time, many climate change-related suits either pushed for
government action140 or requested judicial remedies that would be preempted by
legislative or administrative action.141 However, the Environmental Protection Agency
has acted upon the Supreme Court’s 2009 Massachusetts v. EPA decision by developing
and implementing greenhouse gas reporting requirements and limitations for new

132

See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 130. These commentators see climate change as falling under a different
category of activist litigation, seeking from the courts determinations that the plaintiffs could not achieve in
the political branches. Id.
133
“Public interest tort litigation, unlike ordinary torts, raises serious justiciability concerns whether
analyzed under either standing or the political question doctrine.” Id.
134
E.g., May, supra note 130.
135
Id.
136
See Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law, 34
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (stating that “[m]odern environmental law grew out of the common
law tort system, and modern regulation of pollution arose in an effort to deal with the inadequacies of the
common law”).
137
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co.
II), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)
(relying heavily on Massachusetts v. EPA for its standing analysis).
138
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
139
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
140
See, e.g., id.
141
See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The scope
and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals the transcendently legislative nature of this litigation.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to cap carbon dioxide emissions and mandate annual reductions of an as-yetunspecified percentage.”).
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stationary sources.142 This potential preemption formed the cornerstone of the Solicitor
General’s argument in defense of the Tennessee Valley Authority in American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut, a position that the Court ultimately found persuasive.143
However, because fraud-related tort actions do not entail remedies that would act directly
upon greenhouse gas emissions, and federal fraud statutes are not written to preempt state
action,144 climate litigants would not run the same risk of having their suits federally
preempted. Further, unlike some of the remedies sought in public nuisance cases, any
injunctive remedy for fraud would not require the court to act in a legislative function to
establish or oversee emissions caps, which triggers separation of powers and justiciability
concerns. In AEP II, the Fifth Circuit quickly pointed out that part of the reason that the
case was more judicially palatable than prior climate change nuisance cases was that
“[t]he plaintiffs d[id] not assert any federal or public law actions and d[id] not seek
injunctive relief.”145 Thus, to the extent that judges fear legislating from the bench, the
still somewhat novel idea of causes of actions based on climate change are less daunting
if compensation comes down to the monetary value of the injury.
III. IF TOBACCO FRAUD WAS JUSTICIABLE, WHY NOT CLIMATE FRAUD?
While tobacco litigants struggled for decades to win a case based on tobacco’s
connection to cancer, the complex causal chain between exposure to tobacco smoke and
disease did not prove to be an insurmountable barrier to adjudication. Yet the complex
causal chain between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change-related injuries, such
as severe weather and sea-level rise, has. Climate change fraud litigation faces two major
standing barriers and a political question barrier. There are two major standing issues that
142

A little over a year after Massachusetts, the EPA released an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPR): Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act soliciting comments on how the
EPA should proceed. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
74 Fed. Reg. 55292 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified 74 Fed. Reg. § 32744). Following the ANPR,
the EPA initiated the rulemaking process to determine whether or not greenhouse gases endangered human
health and welfare such that the EPA would have a duty to regulate under the CAA. This was decided in
the affirmative on December 7, 2009 in a final rule finding the threat of climate change sufficient to
warrant a finding of endangerment. 74 Fed. Reg. § 32744 (July 18, 2009). Because there is overlap between
the waiver and the possibility of heightened new vehicle emissions regulations under Massachusetts, the
waiver hearing was originally stayed until the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts. “The two kinds of
standards can overlap significantly, in that the technology used to increase fuel efficiency will also lead to
reductions in emissions of one of the GHGs—CO2 —but they are not the same legal requirements and the
regulations do not apply in the same manner.” Id. at § 32751–52. On April 1, 2010, the EPA finalized the
new fuel economy standards sought by the plaintiffs in Massachusetts. Id.
143
Brief for Tennessee Valley Authority Supporting Petitioners, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131
S.Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174). The Solicitor General asked the Court to reverse the appellate court’s
decision in AEP II and remand back to the court to consider whether the plaintiffs’ claims are generalized
grievances that would be better addressed by the political branches and barred as a matter of prudential
standing, and also whether regulations implemented by the EPA after Massachusetts v. EPA preempt the
plaintiffs’ common law claims. The Court ended up reversing on those very grounds. Am. Elec. Power Co.,
Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).
144
Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 473
U.S. 606 (1985) (“Congress enacted RICO in order to supplement, not supplant, the available remedies
since it thought those remedies offered too little protection for the victims.”).
145
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer II), 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009).
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tobacco fraud litigation did not have to grapple with to the same degree. First, identifying
plaintiffs with particularized injuries was never a serious concern for tobacco fraud. A
lawyer pursuing the tobacco industry need only look for smokers who died from or were
suffering from health effects linked to smoking. In contrast, both the global nature of
climate change and the general nature of the mass fraud allegations make it more difficult
to identify a climate change fraud plaintiff with a particularized injury. Second, while the
causal chain between tobacco use and cancer was fiercely litigated,146 the case that
consumers would smoke less, or individual smokers would not have started smoking but
for ignorance of the health risks, is relatively straightforward. Conversely, the numerous
political and economic factors at play in both the consumer and political choices related
to climate change make it difficult to argue that greenhouse gas emissions would be
lower but for the industry consciously sponsoring misinformation. These concerns could
both be addressed by extending the reasoning applied in Massachusetts v. EPA.147 With
respect to standing concerns about generalized grievances, the legal reasoning favoring
states as climate change plaintiffs in climate change nuisance cases—that there is a
sovereign interest in the protection of public resources (e.g. coastline)—can be applied to
fraud claims as well. With respect to but for causation concerns, the notion of small, but
significant, contribution elaborated in Massachusetts v. EPA could be similarly extended
to fraud claims.
There is also the issue of political question doctrine. When it comes to climate
change-related litigation, courts often conflate the scientific question of whether or not an
injury is attributable to the defendant’s actions with the political question of how to
regulate greenhouse gases.
A. Identifying a Plaintiff with Standing
As the Fifth Circuit observed in Comer II, the largest obstacle to a successful
climate change-based fraud case is standing.148 When powerful special interests engage in
massive campaigns to confuse the public about important issues everyone is injured, but
the mere existence of injury does not guarantee jurisdiction. In tobacco fraud litigation,
the class of plaintiffs often consists of every smoker within a certain place and timeframe.
Yet standing is rarely challenged in tobacco fraud litigation because the connection
between the influence of the deception on consumer choices and the injury is clear: the
product is more directly dangerous than the manufacturers represented. Assuming climate
change plaintiffs’ factual claims have merit, the same could be considered true for
climate change: the products (carbon based fuels, the internal combustion engine, etc.)
contributed to a risk that was downplayed by those who profited from the consumption.
But the major challenge for climate change plaintiffs is drawing a concrete and
particularized nexus between the deception and their injuries.
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David A. Curran, Funds v. Big Tobacco and the Proximate-Cause Issue: A Framework for Derivative
Injuries, 80 TEX. L. REV. 393, 395 (2001) (“Between 1954 and 1994, 813 claims were filed against tobacco
companies.”).
147
Comer II, 585 F.3d at 869 (finding plaintiffs’ claims of fraud to be based on too generalized and
theoretical an injury).
148
Id.
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The causal issues posed by climate change generally have not proven a complete
bar to prudential standing.149 However, for fraud claims, the reliance/injury causal
connection becomes slightly more attenuated and courts have been more reluctant to
connect the misrepresentation back to the original injury.150 In Comer II, in describing the
general nature of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court fixated on the enormous scope of the
misrepresentation, observing that the claim involves “every purchaser of petrochemicals
and the entire American citizenry,” rather than looking for the causal chain that connects
the misrepresentation to the particularized injury pled.151 The causal connection between
consumer and political choices made in reliance on industry representations may be more
attenuated than the connection between carbon emissions and nuisance the court accepted
in the first part of its decision.152 However, the court does not even reach that point. It
finds only a generalized grievance because it drops the chain before it reaches the injury.
The Fifth Circuit is, so to speak, so overwhelmed by the forest that it misses the trees. As
a result, the court fails to adequately explain: 1) why the nuisance claim is adequately
particularized but the fraud claim is not, where you have the same injured parties; and 2)
why any of the rationales behind prudential standing apply. While precedent does not
favor future climate fraud plaintiffs, as explained below, the judicial obstacle of
prudential standing is not necessarily insurmountable.
Tobacco litigation—in particular, Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc.—is informative on the reliance causal nexus.153 In Laborers Local,
labor union health and welfare trust funds sued major tobacco corporations for conspiring
to deceive the general public about the danger and addictiveness of smoking, which
consequently cost the health fund millions of dollars in added health expenses.154
Defendants moved to dismiss the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the causal
connection between plaintiff’s allegations and their injuries was too attenuated.155 The
court looked at the purpose of requiring a direct relationship between conduct and injury.
The court noted that (1) the more distance between cause and injury, the more difficult it
is to determine the extent of the contribution to the injury;156 (2) allowing indirect causes
of action increased the risk of duplicative relief;157 and (3) it does not put forth the
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See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (finding that the threat of erosion and sea
level rise to coastal land owned by the state as a result of climate change was a sufficiently concrete and
particularized injury for standing purposes); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II),
582 F.3d 309, 341–42 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)
(noting California’s particularized injury of declined snowpack); Comer II, 585 F.3d at 863 (“In their
nuisance, trespass and negligence claims, the plaintiffs have clearly satisfied the first and third
constitutional minimum standing requirements. These state common-law tort claims, in which plaintiffs
allege that they sustained actual, concrete injury in fact to their particular lands and property, can be
redressed by the compensatory and punitive damages they seek for those injuries.”).
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Comer II, 585 F.3d at 869.
151
Id.
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Id. at 860.
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Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, 7 F. Supp.2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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Id. at 282.
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plaintiff that would be in the best position to vindicate that injury.158 The court held that
while there may be other parties with incentive to bring fraud claims against the tobacco
companies, no other party would have the same incentive to “vindicate the harm to
plaintiffs—their reduced ability to minimize health-care expenses and their assumption of
the financial burden of tobacco-related disease,” and these particular harms would go
without remedy and without ability to bring suit.159
To date, the only climate change plaintiffs that have found injuries particularized
enough for a cause of action have been states who have lost or stand to lose property as a
result of a natural system altered by climate change.160 Some scholars see Massachusetts
v. EPA as a move toward applying a more precautionary approach to standing.161 A broad
reading of Massachusetts v. EPA gives states a special solicitude to protect sovereign
interests with respect to climate change in court.162 This would be an extension of the
notion that “a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both
physical and economic-of its residents in general.”163 Such an application of state
standing would strongly favor allowing states to bring climate change fraud suits on
behalf of the consumer and property interests of their citizens.
Conversely, a more narrow interpretation of state standing in a climate change
context recognizes a limited procedural right to parens patriae standing where there is
field preemption of a state sovereign interest.164 In the case of Massachusetts v. EPA, this
was the Clean Air Act’s preemption of greenhouse gas regulation.165 This reasoning
could not be applied to climate change fraud because there is no field preemption
preventing states from passing their own laws to promote greater transparency. This
reading has not been favored because the Court expressly conferred standing based on
more than just a procedural right.166 In AEP II, the court allowed parens patriae standing
based on the state’s quasi-sovereign interests in the health and welfare of its citizens,
158

Id.
Id.
160
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (parens patriae interest in threat of loss of
coastline due to sea level rise); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d
309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (parens patriae
interest in threat to state natural resources).
161
Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 511 (2008)
(“Courts should find that the ‘injury’ prong of standing is satisfied where the plaintiff can show that the
harm that it might suffer would be catastrophic and irreversible, and that its occurrence is subject to great
uncertainty.”).
162
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), the
Court recognized that a “[State] independent interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported
federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign
territory today.”).
163
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
164
Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 273, 320–21 (2007).
165
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (“Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some
circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be
pre-empted.”).
166
“Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.” Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
159
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consistent with the broader understanding of climate change standing.167 Such quasisovereign interests are also at stake in a climate change fraud case. Thus, unlike the
private litigants in Comer,168 a climate change-based fraud claim might stand a better
chance of adjudication if brought by a state on behalf of its citizens.
B. Causation
The second standing issue that is more challenging in a climate fraud context is
causation. Even if a state bringing the cause of action helps establish standing under a
more relaxed inquiry, a climate change fraud plaintiff is going to have a more difficult
time than a tobacco plaintiff establishing that there would be no injury absent a
defendant’s actions. The causal reasoning of the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA could be
extended to a fraud context to address this problem. In Massachusetts, the Court found
that, in the context of Massachusetts’ parens patriae claim, traceability and redressability
were satisfied on a theory that EPA’s failure to regulate contributed to the plaintiffs’
injuries.169 Such a contribution theory could be extended to both lack of political action
and consumer action based on industry-sponsored doubt. While there are key distinctions
between climate change and tobacco fraud cases, these distinctions should not create an
insurmountable obstacle to adjudication on the merits because the reasoning of
Massachusetts could be extended to address both the issue of particularity and the issue
of causation.
C. Scientific Questions vs. Political Questions
Political question doctrine also remains an issue in a climate change context, where
it never was in the context of tobacco fraud litigation. When it comes to climate change,
courts often conflate the scientific question of whether or not an injury is attributable to
the defendant’s actions with the political question of how to regulate greenhouse gases.
As discussed above, in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, the court found that the
case raised nonjusticiable political questions under two Baker factors.170 First, the court
found a lack of judicially manageable standards.171 The court’s argument is built entirely
around the lack of judicially manageable standards for judging the reasonableness of the
defendant’s interference for the public nuisance claim.172 The Kivalina court did not
167

Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 309, 338 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (“Their quasi-sovereign interests involving
their concern for the ‘health and well-being—both physical and economic-of [their] residents in
general,’ . . . are classic examples of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest. The States have alleged that the
injuries resulting from carbon dioxide emissions will affect virtually their entire populations.”) (quoting
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
168
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009) reh'g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th
Cir. 2010), on reh'g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (identifying as plantiffs “residents and owners
of lands and property along the Mississippi Gulf coast.”).
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549 U.S. at 523 (“EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between manmade
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a minimum, therefore, EPA's refusal to regulate such
emissions ‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’[s] injuries.”).
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Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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Id. at 874.
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Id.
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address the judicial manageability of addressing the plaintiff’s fraud claims. However, it
is difficult to imagine that climate change fraud would be any more or less manageable
than any other alleged scientific misrepresentation. Just like with tobacco fraud, a court
confronting questions of fraud would look at the quality of the information on which the
claims were based and determine whether the defendants could reasonably make the
claims they did based on the information they had.
Second, the Kivalina court found that a judgment would require a threshold policy
determination that would be of a legislative nature.173 Plaintiffs tried to argue that this
was not the case because they were not seeking injunctive relief, which would require the
court to limit greenhouse gas emissions.174 The threshold policy determination the court
identified was “who should bear the cost of global warming.”175 This is all well and good,
but like the argument over second Baker factor, it does not apply to the climate fraud
issue. Regardless of who should bear the cost of global warming, it is unlawful to
knowingly misrepresent information in such a way that it causes injury.
What is telling about the court’s analysis in Kivalina is the way basic scientific
questions underlie the determinations that the court portrays as political. For example, in
distinguishing climate change-related nuisance claims from the air and water pollution
case law plaintiffs cited in defense of judicially manageable standards, the court places a
lot of emphasis on the complexity of the causal chain between defendant’s actions and
plaintiff’s injury.176 But this distinction is fundamentally a question of the scientific
validity of the causal chain, not a question of political policy. To the extent that scientific
questions were not problematic for tobacco litigants, neither should the science of climate
change intimidate the courts out of confronting these important factual and legal
questions. Especially since the science of climate change, though complex, is just as, if
not more accepted than the science that linked tobacco use to cancer.177
IV. WHY LITIGATE?
The advantage to dealing with the issues of scientific fraud in the courtroom, versus
in the political branches, is that courts isolate questions of fact from questions of law or
opinion, and they have procedural rules, which separate truth from political rhetoric. The
173

Id. at 876.
Id.
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Id. at 876–77.
176
Id. at 876.
In contrast, the harm from global warming involves a series of events disconnected from the
discharge itself. In a global warming scenario, emitted greenhouse gases combine with other gases
in the atmosphere which in turn results in the planet retaining heat, which in turn causes the ice
caps to melt and the oceans to rise, which in turn causes the Arctic sea ice to melt, which in turn
allegedly renders Kivalina vulnerable to erosion and deterioration resulting from winter storms.
Id.
177
“I think we understand the mechanisms of CO2 and climate better than we do of what causes lung
cancer. . . . In fact, it is fair to say that global warming may be the most carefully and fully studied
scientific topic in human history.” Ralph Cicerone, president of the National Academy of Sciences, before
the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Questions Surrounding the ‘Hockey Stick’
Temperature Studies: Implications for Climate Change Assessments Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, July 27, 2006, available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/193612-1
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modern federal rule was established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.178 In
Daubert, children and parents of children suffering from birth defects sued manufacturers
of Bendectin, a drug prescribed to pregnant women to treat morning sickness.179 The
Supreme Court found that the general scientific acceptance test in Frye v. United States180
was superseded by Fed. R. Evid. 702, which at the time stated: “If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”181
Daubert essentially established the trial judge as the “gate keeper of the science”182 by
developing a “flexible” test weighing several relevant factors.183 Subsequent caselaw
built upon this gatekeeper function to include independence as a consideration in the
evaluation of the scientific validity of the evidence, something particularly relevant to the
fraud accusations leveled at the hydrocarbon industry. 184
Because Daubert designates the judge as the gatekeeper, the evidence stage of
litigation is often fiercely contested and outcome determinative. A good example of this
can be found in Minnesota v. Tobacco Industry, a lawsuit against six major tobacco
companies and two trade organizations initiated in 1994 in Minnesota state court by the
state of Minnesota and Minnesota Blue Cross/Blue Shield.185 The allegations included
conspiracy, fraud, misrepresentation, anticompetitive behavior, and unjust enrichment.186
Among the claims, plaintiffs maintained that, by virtue of specific representations
made to the public in Minnesota newspapers in 1954, professing a belief that their
178

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
Id.
180
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (demanding evidence be “sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field which it belongs”).
181
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
182
MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 162. This gate-keeping function has a huge impact on the outcome of trials.
If the judge excludes the evidence, there is usually nothing left to the plaintiff’s case, and the
judge issues a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Alternatively, if the judge rules that
the plaintiff’s experts may testify, the case often settles, with both sides preferring that outcome to
the high costs and the all-or-nothing stakes of a jury trial.
Id. Understandably, there is concern that this places too much fact-finding power in the hands of the judge.
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These factors include: “whether it can be (and has been) tested,” “whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication,” “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. Under Daubert,
acceptance and establishment would still be considered, but weighted with other measures of validity. Id.
The rule was subsequently amended to incorporate Daubert factors, requiring “(1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
184
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (“One very
significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.”). Daubert II presents an added
challenge to any party seeking to enter expert testimony that is not based on independent research. If the
proffered expert testimony is not based on independent research, the party proffering it must come forward
with other objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony is based on “scientifically valid principles.” Id.
at 1311, 1317–18.
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Zeger et al., supra note 11, at 305.
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Id. at 305.
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tobacco products were not harmful to human health and promising to “safeguard the
public health,” the defendants created a “special duty.”187 They also alleged that tobacco
companies conspired to prevent the development of a safer cigarette and disseminated
false information.188 The trial lasted ten weeks, and plaintiffs presented twenty witnesses
to establish the harmful effects of tobacco use and industry misconduct.189 Defendants
presented ten witnesses in its defense.190 The suit ultimately settled before the jury
returned a verdict, with the state of Minnesota receiving $6.1 billion and Minnesota Blue
Cross/Blue Shield receiving millions.191
On the other hand, there is cause for concern over the propriety and effectiveness of
placing a judge in this gate-keeping role. Commentators have observed that the shift from
general scientific acceptance as a test to a more flexible balancing of factors takes the
scientific judgment out of the hands of the scientific community and puts it into the hands
of lay judges.192 There is also concern about inconsistency and confusion in the judicial
application of Daubert.193 However, a study of removal rates among states applying
Daubert and states applying Frye revealed no significant difference, which calls into
question any strategic advantage gained by courts being more receptive to scientific
evidence that is not generally accepted.194
Adjudication also offers advantages over both resolution via the political branches
and via the public forum. Unlike the public forum, courtrooms have rules of evidence;
they have exhibits and cross-examination. In court, witnesses are under oath to tell the
truth and experts have to disclose their credentials.195 These rigors and protections also
recommend adjudication over legislation. In contrast to the extensive and uniform rules
of evidence and procedure for federal judicial hearings, the rules for congressional
hearings are set at the committee level and tend to be less formal.196 Witnesses are
typically selected by a committee member and most committees make an effort to include
witnesses selected by the minority parties for political balance.197 There are no
gatekeepers to vet experts based on expertise. For example, comedian Stephen Colbert
was called to give testimony in a congressional hearing on immigration,198 and science
187
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HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1085 (2006).
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Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility
Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005).
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The problem is this: in court, there are rules of evidence (you have to tell the truth) and a judge
who has the expertise and is given the resources to make an intelligent decision about what is
being presented. But there are no such rules in the public conversation. There are only tactics,
strategies and spin.
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 30.
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Betsy Palmer, Cong. Research Serv., Senate Committee Hearings: Arranging Witnesses (Sept. 25,
2009).
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Ashley Parker, The Whole Truthiness and Nothing But, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Sept. 24, 2010, 1:19
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fiction writer Michael Crichton has been called to present testimony on climate change
before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.199
Controlling climate change fraud via tort liability would also be more desirable for
industry in the long term rather than addressing misleading claims via legislation. From a
First Amendment perspective, liability would allow more flexibility to deal with only the
most serious cases rather than trying to regulate scientific claims directly. Also, industry
would still be protected from frivolous litigation, at least at the federal level by
heightened pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9.200
A complicating factor in adjudicating the “climate change debate” is how aligned
and intertwined the anti-climate change commercial lobby has become with general
conservative, antiregulatory politics.201 This cross-pollination of science and politics has
been problematic both for the science of climate change and for the politics. On the one
hand, this alliance muddies the First Amendment waters, as the pursuit of fraud claims
against petroleum companies also implicates—and could chill—legitimate political
speech. On the other hand, it would also be imprudent to allow special interests to
“scientize” their politics with false science to confuse and manipulate the public. 202
It should be noted that self-interested speech is not inherently improper. Professor
Martin H. Redish warns of the dangers of conflating democratically healthy, selfinterested advocacy with fraud.203 Based on his experience with tobacco litigation, he
observes that there is nothing inherently wrong with adversarial research, especially
conducted in response to a potential liability.204 He points out the no-win situation
199

Michael K. Janofsky, Michael Crichton, Novelist, Becomes Senate Witness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005,
at E1.
200
The requirement to plead claims requiring scienter with particularity places a higher burden on plaintiffs
to bring meritorious claims.
201
See, e.g., Memorandum from Frank Lutz, Consultant, to President George Walker Bush, The
Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America 137 (2002), available at
http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/LuntzResearch_environment.pdf.
Voters believe there is no consensus about global warming within the scientific community.
Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, their views about global
warming will change accordingly. Therefore you need to continue to make the lack of scientific
certainty a primary issue in the debate, and defer to scientists and other experts in the field.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
202
The people who are blocking or delaying action on climate change are putting the whole human
population at risk. If they are doing so out of some sincere, if wrong-headed, belief that climate
change really isn’t a problem, then their actions might be forgivable. But if they are doing it
because their eagerness to post short-term profits overwhelms their judgment on their interest in
the public good, then they should be subject to the full dose of public wrath.
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 87.
203
Of tobacco industry lawyers he observes, “[i]n their capacity as adversaries acting in anticipation of
legal conflict, industry lawyers could appropriately choose to support only those research efforts that they
reasonably believed might lead to scientific data or conclusions supporting their client’s position on the
potentially outcome-determinative issue.” Martin H. Redish, The Adversarial System, Democratic Theory,
and the Constitutional Role of Self-Interest, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 385 (2001).
204
By conducting or supporting unlimited scientific research, the companies would effectively have
been placing themselves in a no-win situation with the buying public. On the one hand, if the
research appeared to establish the absence of a linkage, public skepticism of the results of any
research supported directly by the industry would have rendered the evidence of little use in
convincing the public of the product’s safety. On the other hand, if the results of the research
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manufacturers face when they responsibly sense that there might be a problem with their
product.205 Redish sees working through intermediaries as a means of getting around the
problem, in the sense that any vindicating research would have greater credibility.206
However, he does acknowledge that the appearance of independence could also be
abused, observing “it is conceivable that an industry could simply fabricate or falsely
alter the results of its own or independently conducted research . . . Such actions would
amount to fraud by the perpetration of conscious falsehoods, already shown to fall
outside the . . . proper scope of adversary theory.”207
Thus, it is crucial that any inquiry into the legitimacy of the use of science to
persuade the public against climate change regulation not become an inquisition against
legitimate voices of dissent, even if the interests involved are not entirely independent.208
From a policy perspective, it would be harmful to the public interest to punish
commercially interested research with liability. Yet, a chilling effect could also be evaded
by confronting the issue in federal court and applying clear standards of scientific validity
to conflicting climate change claims in order to distinguish the legitimate self-interested
science from fraudulent manipulations of research intended to mislead the public.
Commentator Holly Doremus elaborates on how the intermingling of science and
politics inevitably corrupts both. She notes “[t]he core of the problem is not the
involvement of politics but its concealment behind a cloak of science.”209 Doremus points
out that often science is used to undermine or delay political decisions that ultimately rest
on policy and value judgments, not empirical data.210 In many ways, allowing a fraud
action based on climate change denial would be a step towards determining if, and to
what extent, politics are at work behind the climate change veil. It should be noted that
climate change activists are not the only parties interested in unraveling this relationship.
Following the leak of private e-mail communications between several prominent
climatologists performing research in the field, the blogosphere was atwitter with climate

tended to confirm the linkage, both as a legal and practical matter, the industry would have been
saddled with those conclusions even if its leaders honestly doubted their scientific validity.
Id. at 396.
205
Id. at 399.
206
What the industry did to extract itself from this no-win dilemma, at least on the surface, reflected a
form of true legal brilliance. It developed what was originally known as the Tobacco Industry
Research Council, later changed to the Council for Tobacco Research. The Council, though fully
supported by the industry, included a board of eminent scientists under the supervision of a
prestigious scientist-director who served as an employee of the industry.
Id. at 399–400 (footnote omitted).
207
Id. at 401.
208
The important point to keep in mind, however, is that if the free and open inquiry contemplated by
the First Amendment is to be meaningful, the mere fact that a private individual or entity
maintains a view of the science different from government or the existing scientific community
cannot, in and of itself, constitute proof of either knowledge, falsity, or recklessness.
Id. at 403.
209
Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32
ECOLOGY L. Q. 249, 253 (2005).
210
“The vast majority of the disagreements are not over the data themselves. They are instead over what
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skeptics calling for RICO inquiries into climate change research institutions.211 To the
extent a party can put together a proper fraud case demonstrating that the public is being
cynically manipulated one way or another about climate change with dubious science, the
responsible parties should have to answer for it in court, lest Lysenkoism hijack our
policy decisions on the issue.212
CONCLUSION
In considering whether climate change fraud is capable of being litigated or
desirable to litigate, it is easy to get lost in the size and complexity of the issue of climate
change itself. Up until Massachusetts v. EPA, courts were hesitant to entertain any claims
of injury resulting from climate change for this reason. However, if one steps back and
looks at the global atmosphere as any other body, and climate change as any other disease
caused by an imbalance in the systems that regulate that body, the issues start to take
focus. Whether the smoke is coming from a tail pipe or a Marlboro light, once the causal
connection is established between the intentional misrepresentation, the pollutant, the
disease, and a concrete and particularized injury, there exists a triable cause of action.
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Christopher C. Horner, Manipulating Climate Change: Warming to RICO?, BIG GOVERNMENT (Nov.
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could be inherited, rejecting the already well-established evidence that genes control inheritance. Promising
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